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Some Variations in Inventory Valuations
By T. H. Sanders

Cost or market, whichever is the lower, is still the most widely
accepted rule for valuing inventories of raw materials, work in
process and unsold finished stock. Under steady price conditions
it is undoubtedly the safe and reasonable rule; moreover, there is
very great advantage in a uniform and generally recognized prac
tice, since no one is then left in doubt as to the basis on which
this item has been determined and profits computed. But it is
doubtful whether an item of such importance can be left to the
arbitrary action of any single rule, and, as a matter of fact, there
is very high business and accounting authority for modifications
under certain conditions.
The present article consists in substance of a comparison be
tween the practices of the National Lead Company, the Inter
national Harvester Company and the United States Steel Cor
poration, as shown by a study of their annual reports during the
last fifteen years, but with special reference to the war period.
Incidentally one gets an interesting contrast in methods of report
ing to stockholders, and of certification by outside auditors as
authority for published statements. The net result of this in
vestigation is that a broad view of the subject of inventory valua
tion may well require substantial modification of the common
rule, without resorting to measures too drastic for reasonable
consideration. At the present moment, moreover, there seems to
be some tendency for inventories to increase, and there is a pos
sibility that accountants may again be confronted with a mild
form of the problems which faced them in 1920.
National Lead Company
The National Lead Company gives very little accounting in
formation in its annual reports, offering practically no details
concerning profit and loss, and very few comments on the balancesheet. The annual reports from 1917 to 1925 inclusive contain
no mention of any public accountant having seen their records or
certified their accounts. This comment is not intended as a
stricture; the entire series of reports creates an impression of
solidity, cautious yet effective management, and a desire on the
part of the directors to do their duty to their stockholders, their
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employees and the public. Nevertheless, the adequate reporting
and authentication of company results is of importance, and the
National Lead Company is conservative in this respect.
From 1911 to 1913 no remarks are made on the inventory in the
report. The 1914 report contains the statement, “Inventories
have been taken on our usual conservative basis.” In 1915 an
item entitled “Metal reserve” appeared on the liability side of the
balance-sheet to the amount of $200,000. By way of explanation
it was stated that this amount was to cover rises in the market
prices of tin and antimony—rises which were then expected to be
reversed in the near future. In 1916 this metal reserve was in
creased to $300,000, and the same figureappeared in the 1917report.
In 1916, 1917 and 1918, each annual inventory showed an in
crease of $1,000,000 over the previous year. In the last-named
year the metal reserve was accordingly increased to $1,000,000,
and reference was made in the report to the necessity of keeping a
minimum quantity of stock on hand, in order to do business. In
1919 a further million was added to the inventory, and in 1920 the
increase was three and a half million dollars. It was at this point
that the company printed in its annual report the statement that it
had throughout the war valued lead, the main item in its inventory,
at 3.4 cents a pound, the lowest price at which purchases were
made during 1914. The explanation given was as follows:
Our normal-stock system of taking inventories has been followed in the
preparation of this statement, with the exception noted below.
Prior to the war, the National Lead Company divided its inventories
into normal stocks and excess above normal. The normal stocks were
valued at the lowest price reached by metals in the year 1914. The excess
above normal was valued at cost. The normal stocks never change—either
in quantity or value placed thereon. The excess above normal varies in
quantity and value according to the facts. In case of an encroachment
upon the normal stock at any branch creating a deficiency, a reserve is
created in the normal-stock inventory sufficient to buy the amount of
such deficiency at the replacement value of the metal at that time—the
first metal purchased being used to make good the deficiency in the normal
stock.
In fixing the amount of normal stocks, we determine the amount of
metal (whether lead, tin, copper or antimony) in the following manner:
1. The amount of metal normally in transit to our factories.
2. The amount of raw metal necessary in the factories to prevent pos
sible stoppage of manufacturing, due to transportation or other difficulties.
3. The amount of metal in process of manufacture, which in case of
white lead extends over several months.
4. The amount of manufactured products necessary to be carried in
stock at factories and warehouses, in order to make prompt deliveries.
The result is that about 80% of our total inventories is in normal stocks.
Inasmuch as the purchases of raw materials from month to month approx
imately equal our sales of metal in the form of manufactured products from
month to month we adopt the fiction:—that the metal sold in the form of
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manufactured products during any given month was made out of the
metal bought during that month, and the normal stock is never touched,
and our inventories, therefore, are valued at cost.
For all practical purposes, the normal stock is like a piece of machinery
which the company has to have always on hand in order to operate. When
the price for pig lead, for instance, went to 11 cents a pound, the National
Lead Company could not make an actual profit thereon without selling its
normal stocks but, in that event, it would either have to buy back such
normal stocks at the then market, or go out of business. In the latter
case, it would lose the value of its goodwill and the cost of the marketing,
which would be far greater than any possible profit on sale.
This being true we do not deceive ourselves by marking up inventory
values and taking book profits, upon which we could not realize, to be fol
lowed later by book losses of like amount. Bookkeeping is likely to affect
policy. By taking book profits on ascending markets of raw material, a
company is likely to be led into extravagance and wastefulness. On the
other hand, book losses during a period of declining market are likely to be
discouraging and may become embarrassing. Our stockholders are also
likely to be deceived by apparent high earnings followed by severe losses,
if such book profits and losses are reported in our published state
ments.
The advantage to the company of this safe and conservative method of
taking inventories has been made manifest during the last few years. For
instance, the market price of pig lead advanced from the low price of $3.40
per hundred pounds, at which our normal stock of lead is inventoried, to
$11 (or higher) during the war years, and on December 31, 1920, it had
fallen to $4.75. Inasmuch as we have never taken any book profits, we do
not now have to take any book losses. It would have been just as reason
able to mark up the value of our plants and machinery to the replacement
value thereof during the war years (with a consequent showing of book
profits), and then write them down to present replacement values (with a
consequent showing of book losses), as to make similar variations in our
normal stock.
Of course, as to our excess above normal stocks—which have always been
inventoried at actual cost until written down to the market on December
31, 1920—we have like all others who have inventoried at market or cost
(whichever is lower), made profits and losses. But these, while serious,
are relatively unimportant.
Because of the unusually rapid and pronounced decline in the market
price of metals at the close of the year, it was deemed prudent to create
additional normal stocks where needed, and inventory all excess above
normal stocks at market instead of at cost. Inasmuch as the normal
stock system of inventory, as above described, automatically creates in
itself a metal reserve, the metal reserve of one million dollars—created in
1918—was used for this purpose, as originally intended.

The significance of this policy may be gathered from the two
tables given on pages 432 and 433. From the 1922 report one learns
that the ‘‘normal stock’’ of lead had been 80,000 tons; the net effect
is, therefore, that the inventory has been written down from the
usual cost or market basis by the difference between 3.4 cents a
pound and current prices, multiplied by 80,000 tons. For pur
poses of this computation the average annual prices for pig lead
have been used,* which are doubtless a fair approximation to
what cost or market would be in any one year.
*Bureau of labor statistics, Bulletin No. 367, pp. 144-5.
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T able
I

1913...........................................
1914 ...........................................
1915 ...........................................
1916 ...........................................
1917 ...........................................
1918 ...........................................
1919 ...........................................
1920 ...........................................
1921...........................................
1922 ...........................................

$5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000
5,440,000

Lead basic
inventory
at lowest
1914 price

4.4
3.9
4.6
6.8
9.1
7.4
5.8
8.1
4.6
5.8
$7,040,000
6,240,000
7,360,000
10,880,000
14,560,000
11,840,000
9,280,000
12,960,000
7,360,000
9,280,000

market
price
Basic inventory
for year
at the year ’s
(cents)
average price

Average
Excess over
basic value
$1,600,000
800,000
1,920,000
5,440,000
9,120,000
6,400,000
3,840,000
7,520,000
1,920,000
3,840,000

Showing adjustment of inventories of National Lead Company from normal to

$7,300,000
7,200,000
6,300,000
7,300,000
8,200,000
15,000,000
16,000,000
19,600,000
20,600,000
19,600,000

Total
inventory
as reported

“ cost or m arket ”

$8,900,000
8,000,000
8,200,000
12,700,000
17,300,000
21,400,000
19,800,000
27,100,000
22,500,000
23,400,000

Total
inventory
adjusted
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Table II

Showing corresponding adjustment of profits

1914................
1915................
1916................
1917................
1918................
1919................
1920................
1921................
1922................

............
............
............
............
............
............
............
............
............

Reported
net earnings
$2,500,000
2,700,000
3,000,000
4,900,000
4,700,000
4,600,000
4,700,000
3,500,000
4,900,000

Excess
over value
$800,000
1,920,000
5,440,000
9,120,000
6,400,000
3,840,000
7,520,000
1,920,000
3,800,000

Net profits
inventory at
average market

$3,820,000
6,520,000
8,580,000
1,980,000
2,040,000
8,380,000
2,100,000 *
6,780,000

*Loss.

The effect of these comparisons is shown graphically by the
following chart:

National Lead Company: Reported net earnings, and net earnings adjusted
to cost or market basis

In 1922 the report stated that the bureau of internal revenue
had disapproved of the company’s normal-stock method of valu
ing inventory, which necessitated submitting to the government
revised returns, with inventories at cost or market, whichever
was the lower. The report stated that in the long run this would
make no difference in the amount of taxes payable. Most
accountants understand, however, that on account of excess
profits taxes at varying rates, and also because of changes from
year to year in the rates of taxation, the year in which income is
433
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reported does make a difference in the amount of taxes paid over
a series of years.
The 1922 report also stated that the metal reserve covers the
excess costs on the inventory over and above the normal quantity;
this means that the entire inventory, normal and excess above
normal, was practically marked down to a pre-war basis.
Further arguments in favor of the company’s normal-inventory
method appear in the 1924 report. A table was appended to show
the wide fluctuations in profits which would have arisen during the
preceding fifteen months on the normal inventory of lead, now
96,000 tons. During the first three months increases in market
prices would have given a profit of $3,840,000; during the
next three months precisely this amount would have been lost
again. In the next eight months a profit of $6,720,000 would
have been made through increased prices, and over one-third of
this would have been lost again during the next month. In the re
port of the following year the company stated that every one cent a
pound change in the market price of lead meant $2,000,000 to
its inventory. The National Lead Company is still carrying
its normal inventory of lead at the base price of 3.4 cents a
pound, and to this extent eliminates price fluctuations in the
computation of its profits.
An interesting comment on this situation was made by a wellknown investment service, which stated that, as a result of the
normal-inventory method, the company showed “no fancy book
keeping profits during the war period.” One would like to
know if the writer knew precisely what he meant.
International Harvester Company

The International Harvester Company’s experiment in stabili
zation through the inventory was not quite so thoroughgoing as
that considered above. The Harvester Company began only in
1917; it used 1916 prices to value its “basic” (i.e., normal mini
mum) inventory, and abandoned this value in 1921 because
current prices had gone below their base price. The figures of
four years only, therefore, 1917-1920 inclusive, are affected, but
the steadying effect on profits was almost as marked as in the
case of the National Lead Company. The importance of the
problem to the International Harvester Company may be
judged by the fact that its inventory averages 60% of its an
434
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nual sales. The following extracts from its reports will show
the procedure:
December 31, 1916
Raw materials, work in process, and finished products were valued at
cost, which was lower than market at December 31, 1916. In view of the
rapid rise in raw-material prices and the uncertain conditions surrounding
their future course, an addition of $1,000,000 has this year been made to
the inventory depreciation reserve, making the total reserve $2,750,000,
which amount has been deducted from the inventories.
December 31, 1917
Raw materials, work in process, and finished products are valued at 1916
inventory prices (being the actual cost of that year), which are adopted
as a fair and stable basis for inventory valuations during the period of the
war. In addition the company is carrying the general inventory reserve
previously accumulated.
December 31, 1918
Note.—The “basic” inventory, representing a normal quantity of raw
materials, work in process, and finished products, has been valued at 1916
inventory prices (being the actual cost of that year), which were adopted
in 1917 as a fair and stable basis for inventory valuations during the period
of the war. The “excess” inventory (that is, the quantity in excess of
normal) has been valued at reasonable market prices. In addition, the
company is carrying the general inventory reserve previously accumulated.
December 31, 1919
The “ basic” inventory, representing a normal quantity of raw materials,
work in process, and finished products, is valued at 1916 inventory prices
(being the actual cost of that year), which have been adopted as a fair
and stable basis for inventory valuations during the period of high prices.
The “ excess ” inventory (that is, the quantity in excess of normal) is valued
at 1919 cost or market, whichever is lower. The general inventory
reserve of $5,975,000 existing at December 31, 1918, has been utilized
during 1919 in the disposition of war losses.
December 31, 1921
The rapid decline in market values during the year 1921 of the com
modities entering into the company’s products has resulted in price levels
that make unnecessary the continuation of the “basic” inventory method
of valuing inventories; therefore, raw materials and supplies, including
purchases after the close of the manufacturing season, have been valued
at cost or market, whichever was lower, at December 31, 1921. Work in
process of manufacture and finished products have been valued at replace
ment cost, based on market values of raw materials and labor rates at De
cember 31, 1921; such replacement cost being lower than the year’s cost
of production.

The situation was somewhat complicated by the fact that for
part of this period there were two corporations, the International
Harvester Company of New Jersey, and the International
Harvester Corporation. The former did the domestic business,
the latter the foreign business and some “new lines.” The cor
poration sustained heavy losses in Europe through the war, and
the two companies were re-combined in 1919, in time for the New
Jersey Company’s reserves to help to meet the corporation’s losses.
Like the National Lead Company, the International Harvester
Company met with no sympathy from the bureau of internal
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revenue, and was required to file returns and pay taxes upon
profits computed on the usual basis. The company’s officers
nevertheless expressed satisfaction with their experience, and
said that they would do the same thing again in like circum
stances. The adverse arguments of the bureau are stated in the
following paragraph:
Valuation on “base stock” method: The base-stock method of taking
inventory is not warranted by the law or regulations. According to this
method, a manufacturer or dealer values at the same price year after year
the minimum quantity of goods which he must have on hand at all times.
It did not appear that this method had had any considerable recognition
as the best accounting practice, but on the contrary, it was evident that
it had not been widely adopted. A taxpayer who values his inventory
at cost and who retains identifiable goods year after year may attain the
results with respect to such identifiable goods which would be attained
through the use of the base-stock inventory method. Goods which have
been so intermingled that they can not be identified with specific invoices
must, however, be deemed to be the goods most recently purchased be
cause, in the absence of evidence as to the actual facts, this presumption
is more nearly true than any other.—Adv. Bd. rec. 65, 1 C. B. 51.

The reports of the International Harvester Company contain
the full certificate of public accountants, including specific
explanation of the mode of valuing the inventories.

United States Steel Corporation
The United States Steel Corporation arrives at substantially
the same results by a somewhat different process. Its reports
are remarkable for their clarity and completeness; in the matter
under discussion they may be distinguished from the two cases
previously mentioned in that, while avoiding the valuation of
inventories at inflated prices, the exact effect of the adjustment
may be seen, and the balance-sheet and income statement ad
justed to a cost or market basis if the reader so desires. In the
case of the National Lead Company an approximation to this
basis may be made, but not an exact adjustment; while any
attempt to re-compute the International Harvester Company’s
position would be still more of an estimate. Moreover, both the
balance-sheet and the income statement of the steel corporation
are certified on their face by public accountants, in addition to
the complete certification shown on another page, which clearly
states the scope of the audit.
In the 1916 report the detailed inventory schedule shows
$13,500,000 deducted as “reserve for amount of actual cost or
market value of stocks in excess of normal prices therefor.” In
the balance-sheet only the net figure, after deducting this reserve, is
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shown; in the condensed profit-and-loss statement the reserve is
deducted as a special adjustment. The certificate of the auditors
states that “an adequate reserve has been made in respect of all
abnormal values.”
In 1917 this reserve became $30,000,000, in 1918, $51,000,000,
and in 1919, $90,000,000. At this point the certificate discon
tinued the term “abnormal values” and stated that “a sub
stantial reserve has been deducted from the values so deter
mined,” that is, at “approximate cost.” In 1920 the reserve
grew to $95,000,000, still reported in the same way, and it was
stated that this represented the excess of unit prices over similar
prices at the close of 1915. In 1921 the reserve was reduced to
$61,000,000, and it was then described as being “set aside from
earnings of previous years to absorb deflation in valuation in war
period prices which may from time to time develop in respect to
inventory items.” In 1922 the reserve was reduced to $50,000,000,
and remains at approximately that figure in the last annual
statement.
It is clear, therefore, that the balance-sheet might be adjusted
by any interested person, by adding the stated amount of the
reserve to the balance-sheet inventory figure and to the surplus.
The income statement of any year might also be adjusted by
adding to the net profits shown the change in the inventory re
serve for that year. The only point on which we are not informed
by the reports is whether or not the company’s published income
figures were accepted by the internal-revenue bureau.

Conclusions
The net effect of these three company studies is the indication
that business men of the highest standing felt it necessary, in a period
of inflation, to depart from the customary cost or market method
of valuing inventory, and to reserve against such part of the in
creased value as they believed could not be permanent. What is
more, accountants of the highest standing have certified these
statements. The practice is at variance with the common ac
counting rule and is disapproved by the internal-revenue depart
ment. Accountants may, however, very well consider whether
they can not better adapt their rules to the requirements of sound
business, while so presenting the facts that the situation is per
fectly clear to the reader. The basic method described above
was permitted by the income-tax authorities in England, largely
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because of their practice of averaging the profits of three years for
the purpose of computing the taxable income. It may be that in
due time our own internal-revenue bureau will become somewhat
more elastic in this respect.
The suggestion that a minimum or normal inventory is a fixed
investment of the same character as plant assets is ingenious, but
not fully convincing. As the internal-revenue decision points
out, there is a fundamental difference, in that the specific goods of
the inventory are sold and replaced between annual reports,
whereas the identical plant assets are retained. The bureau’s
suggestion that the identical goods of an inventory might be
carried forward from year to year, and a company thus realize the
benefits of the “normal inventory” method, is obviously futile.
The question is one of broad business policy, and is not to be
answered on a basis of simple arithmetic of this sort.
As in so many accounting difficulties, the real question is as to
the period which should be covered by an income statement, in
order to show truly the earnings of a business. If it be supposed
that a period of inflation lasted for five years, at the end of which
prices were at the same level as at the beginning, a single income
statement covering the entire period would include no profit or
loss arising from inventory changes; its income would come
solely from selling goods for more than they cost. Interim income
statements would, on the contrary, contain extra profits during
the period of rising prices, with equal losses during the fall; the
total net profits would be the same. But that does not mean
that one can simply wait for time to iron things out; at any one
point it is not known how soon, or to what extent, rises in prices
will be reversed. Apart from tax considerations, the published
reports should give the best possible guidance to stockholders who
are thinking of selling their holdings during the fluctuations.
Any computations as to the true net worth of a corporation, the
value of its capital stock and its current ratios are certainly more
enlightening when made upon information as given in the reports
of the United States Steel Corporation, than they are if “cost or
market” inventories alone are available. The net effect of the
former presentation is that cost or market values are given for those
who desire them, but a more permanent valuation is added, and is
preferred. The one essential thing is that any departure from
custom should be fully explained, and its effect indicated pre
cisely, in order that no one may be misled in the intermediate Stages.
438

